Chisinau rather hopefully as preparation for membership in the European Union, although realistically its prospects are not good in the near term until it has proven that it has introduced real substantive political and economic reforms, not simulated reforms. . 12 Moldova's avowed European orientation gives the European institutions some leverage as external actors to try and steer the process of democratization in Moldova, such as it is, in the direction of the benchmark of 'European standards. ' The European
Moldova would like to negotiate an Economic
Neighborhood policy also provides Moldova with increased financial aid to engage in a complex series of internal measures that hopefully will measure up to the European benchmarks. 13 The implementation of the EU-Moldovan Action Plan, which was signed Brussels believes that democratic reform in Moldova is not possible without the peaceful 12 For the text of the agreement, which runs to some 95 pages online, see 'Partnership and Cooperation Agreement', http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca_moldova.pdf (27 July 2006). 13 The above section relies very heavily on R. 
GUAM VERSUS RUSSIAN HEGEMONY
In an effort at further enhancing its security, the illiberal regime in Moldova 55 Ukraine also led a move to transform GUAM in the aftermath of the "color" revolutions from a somewhat moribund organization which has languished since its creation into a more robust international organization (a move which triggered Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the organization,although Uzbekistan's participation in GUUAM was lukewarm anyway;
Moldova subsequently closed its diplomatic mission in Uzbekistan). On 23 May 2006,
GUAM officially became an international organization with a Charter, and headquarters in Kiev, Ukraine. 56 It is hoped that a revitalized GUAM would have the capacity to preserve the independence of its members, reduce further Russian influence in the area, end separatism on their territories,(Ukraine is also threatened by separatism in the eastern part of the country)and counter Russian efforts to preserve its hegemony in the region. As
Ukraine possibly moves closer to NATO, the Russian reaction seems to be to preserve the status quo in Transnistria, keeping it within Mosocow's orbit. The efforts to transform GUAM into a more robust security organization as well is perceived by Russia as a threat to the interests of Moscow in its zone of influence, despite rather diplomatic public 55 Andrei Ivantoc and Tudor Petra-Popov), the demilitarization of Transnistria, the dismantling of the secret police apparatus there, the creation of conditions in which free political parties and non-governmental organizations could function, and the guarantee of a free press, among others. Moldova's attitude is also influenced by the fact that the Moldovan parliament adopted a law delineating the special autonomous status of Transnistria on July 22, 2005, to further strengthen its negotiating position and provide the basis for a political settlement, from its perspective. 87 The Moldovan regime had indicated that it would be willing to concede to Tiraspol a "broader autonomy", greater than what the autonomous Turkic region of Gagauzia in Moldova currently enjoys.
Barring a negotiated solution, there is always the possibility that the regime in Tiraspol could declare its independence and be recognized as a sovereign state by Russia.
There is also some support in the Russian Duma for the Transnistrian entity to become a part of Russia. Not surprisingly, a former major opposition figure to the Smirnov regime, Aleksandr Radcenko, (since eclipsed by the rise of the leader of the "Renewal" party, as
Radcenko was defeated in his bid for reelection) also preferred that Transnistria be reintegrated with Russia, rather than pursue a pro-Western orientation perhaps as part of Transnistria, which has also been subjected to economic pressure from Moldova, can also apply economic sanctions as well as military pressure against Chisinau in turn.
Transnistria can block railway communications with Moldova, (although Moldova can try to circumvent Transnistria) cut off electrical power, and the supply of natural gas. 
